Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland On Reconceptualizing Hate Crime Victimisation
‘It is not someone’s identity per se which makes them a vulnerable target in the eyes of the perpetrator, but rather the way in which that identity intersects with other aspects of their self and with other situational factors and context.’
In Reconceptualizing Hate Crime Victimization, Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland highlight the perils of traditional conceptions of hate crime, and how the scholarship needs to have a more inclusive approach by addressing the diverse processes through which a crime motivated by hate manifests itself.
They argue that a conception that a victim of a hate crime has to come from a traditionally marginalised minority group excludes the lived experience of those persons who might not qualify under such a traditional conception but are still victimized due to being perceived as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘different’:
‘… approaching the issue of inclusion through the lens of group identity politics merely exacerbates existing problems, creating divisions among communities of identity rather than highlighting the shared nature of their victimization.’
Therefore, they argue that the conception of hate crime, instead of focusing on a singular or one-dimensional understanding of identity, should rather look at how complex interplay of identities become sites of victimization due to ‘perceived vulnerability’ and ‘difference’ :
‘Such a focus, we assert, would extend recognition to the more ‘hidden’ victims of hate crime and would enable them to receive access to a more extensive range of support services.’
Chakraborti and Garland begin by highlighting how the conventional conceptions of hate crime have marginalised the lived experience of two sets of persons — first, who do not fit into the binary of dominant-subordinate groups, and second, of those whose victimization doesn’t receive adequate attention due to the lack of political representation or resources.
By citing Barbara Perry conception of hate crime — which highlights othering of those who are different, and as a mechanism through which violence is used to sustain both the hegemonic identity of the perpetrator and to reinforce the boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups — Chakraborti and Garland argue that Perry’s framework has led scholars to conceptualise hate crime in a way that marginalises other experiences. They argue:
‘Generalizing about diverse populations — or relying on empty notions of ‘community’ — instead of considering the discrete experiences of those who fall within the parameters of a particular group label tells us little about their particularities and the context behind their vulnerability.’
Another critique of the conceptual framework is that it doesn’t pay much attention to the intersectional understanding of identity — homogenization under the umbrella of ‘subordinated minority’ of diverse identities within such homogenised groups:
‘Recognizing that hate crime can be the outcome of prejudice based on multiple, distinct yet connected, lines is important for recognizing the reality behind both the experience of victimization and the commission of the offence.’
Chakraborti and Garland also challenge the conventional conceptions of hate crime by pointing out that most hate crimes tend to be committed by relatively ordinary people in the context of their everyday lives. They argue that acts that get termed as a hate crime might have little to do with the entrenched prejudice against the other and would instead me motivated my triggering moments or momentary deviation from the standards of behaviour. They say:
‘Conceiving of these offences purely as a mechanism of oppression or subordination overplays what for some perpetrators will be an act borne from boredom, jealousy, convenience or unfamiliarity with ‘difference’. This reality may not make the act any less reprehensible, but recognizing it does affect our interpretation of hate crime.’
They now shift attention to explaining the benefits of having an inclusive approach towards conceptualizing hate crime — an approach which includes ‘perceived vulnerability’ and ‘difference.’ It is argued that this approach can help in acknowledging the risk posed to individuals due to the interplay of various factors such as hate, prejudice, discomfort, opportunism, hostility, etc. This system, which is not identity-centric, looks at the vulnerability which is heightened by the social conditions, prevailing norms, and the reaction to what is perceived as ‘different.’
It is further argued that the framework of ‘perceived vulnerability’ will also acknowledge the experiences of those who do not fit well with the political definition of a victim or lack power or backing of advocacy groups. They argue:
‘Moreover, it is not someone’s identity (their disability, their sexuality and so on) per se that renders them vulnerable in the context of hate crime. Rather, they may become a victim because of how that aspect of their identity intersects with other aspects of their self, and with other situational factors and context, to make them vulnerable in the eyes of the perpetrator.’
Therefore, it is argued, that the perceived vulnerability approach will not only help to understand the victimisation of those who are neglected but also look at the intersectionality of identities — a move away from the singular constructions of identity:
‘Conceiving of hate crimes simply as offences directed towards or motivated by individual strands of a person’s identity fails to give effect to the interplay of identities with one another and with other personal, social and situational characteristics.’
Complement this with David Gadd on Aggravating Racism and Elusive Motivation, and Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld on Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls and Controversies.
